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rAbstract
Worldwide there is an increasing realisation that there is an inextricable link between
the natural and human systems, and there is a need to integrate these into the
governance of small-scale fisheries. The critical importance of adopting such an
approach is argued in this paper by exploring the challenge of resource
over-exploitation in the abalone fishery in South Africa and the loco fishery in Chile,
both of which faced unsuccessful fishery closures and the implementation of
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs). By exploring similarities and differences in
fisheries context and approaches, these case studies highlight that although
management strategies have been progressive on paper, they are compromised, to
different degrees, by a lack of understanding of the socio-economic and political
factors that are influencing the fisheries system. We argue that unless a more
integrated approach is adopted to understand the social-ecological system as a
whole, few long-term benefits will be secured for both the resources and the
livelihoods of fishers.
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Worldwide, natural resource management has shifted from a centralised, top-down
approach to a more holistic and people-centred approach that has involved resource
users and communities in management and decision-making (Meinzen-Dick and Knox
2001). In the coastal and fisheries arena, similar trends are occurring in the area of
small-scale, or artisanal, fisheries management (Berkes et al. 2001; Kooiman et al.
2005). In particular, there is an increasing realisation of the inextricable link between
the natural and human systems, and the critical importance of integrating social, polit-
ical, cultural and institutional factors into the governance of small-scale fisheries
(Kooiman et al. 2005; McClanahan and Castilla 2007; Pomeroy and Andrew 2011).
The notion of ‘systems thinking’ highlights these linkages and reinforces the need to
incorporate the human and ecological dimensions into more holistic approaches to
governance (Charles 2001; Garcia and Charles 2008). Fisheries co-management has
also evolved over the past two decades to highlight the importance of establishing
partnerships between fishers, government authorities and other stakeholders, to share
responsibility and decision-making on resource use and management (Wilson et al. 2003).
This process of sharing power between the stakeholders is considered key to ensuring that
the needs and aspirations of the fishers are acknowledged and incorporated into2013 Hauck and Gallardo-Fernández; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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approaches to management have often been stimulated as a result of resource depletion,
and in some cases, resource crises (Christy 1992; Ostrom 2009). Although this may catalyse
increased collaboration, a ‘crisis’ may be perceived differently between stakeholders,
depending on how the problem is defined, and by whom (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007).
The definition of the problem will invariably impact on the strategies that are developed to
address it (Mahon et al. 2005).
This paper aims to explore and compare the challenge of resource over-exploitation
in two small-scale fisheries in South Africa and Chile (see Figure 1), where new
management approaches have been introduced to address resource collapse, and where
the importance of adopting a systems approach is evident. One must acknowledge
upfront, however, that there are important differences between the fisheries systems in
each country, not the least of which is the fact that the rights allocation policies were
implemented differently, with rights allocated to individuals in South Africa and to
collectives in Chile. Nevertheless, by acknowledging these differences, and exploring
the similarities, these case studies highlight that although management strategies have
been progressive on paper, they are compromised, to different degrees, by a lack of
understanding of the socio-economic and political factors that are influencing the fisheries
system. Further, new governance approaches need to reflect the perceived crisis in relation
to fishers’ experiences and circumstances, and not only in relation to resource collapse. As
Wärneryd and Hilding-Rydevik (1998) argue, environmental problems are social problems.
By first describing the abalone fishery in South Africa, and then the loco fishery in
Chile, the paper concludes with six key observations that have emanated from research
in both countries: (1) an outright fishery ban did not address the problem of resource
over-exploitation; (2) fisheries governance is significantly affected by political transition
at a national level; (3) fisheries decision-making remains too centralised; (4) illegal
fishing is driven by a variety of factors and is a significant challenge to fisheriesFigure 1 Distribution of loco TURFs in Chile and abalone TURFs in South Africa, providing a
South-South comparison.
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and (6) the principle of equity is a key consideration in fisheries governance. Each of
these themes highlights the importance of understanding the social, economic,
ecological and institutional dimensions of the fisheries system.
Southern perspectives: comparisons between South Africa and Chile
Research over the past decade is drawn on from both South Africa (Hauck 1999, 2009;
Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Tarr 2000; Hauck and Kroese 2006; Raemaekers and Britz
2009; Raemaekers et al. 2011) and Chile (Stotz 1997; Meltzoff et al. 2002; Orensanz
et al. 2005; Gelcich et al. 2005, 2006, 2010; Gonzalez et al. 2006; Castilla et al. 2007;
Zuñiga et al. 2008; Gallardo 2008; San Martin et al. 2010; Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo
and Friman 2011) to understand, through a comparative analysis, the dynamics and man-
agement approaches of the abalone (Haliotis midae) and loco (Concholepas concholepas)
fisheries. Empirical research by the authors over the past 15 years in South Africa (for ex-
ample, Hauck 1997, 1999, 2009; Hauck and Sweijd 1999), and the past ten years in Chile
(Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2010; Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman
2011), has included extensive fieldwork in coastal communities, which has largely re-
lied on participatory research methodology, focus groups, key informant interviews,
and in some cases quantitative surveys. This paper, therefore, is a review of secondary
research on these fisheries, which includes reference to the previously published work
of the authors. Although biologically different, the carnivorous loco is known as ‘false
abalone’ due to the fact that it resembles the herbivorous abalone (Geaghan and
Castilla 1988). These fisheries have a different historical timeline and they are influ-
enced by unique national socio-political, economic and fishery dynamics (Table 1).
Although there are differences, the abalone and loco fisheries also incorporate a
number of characteristics that lend themselves to comparison. First, both the abalone
and loco species are destined for the Asian market as a delicacy enjoyed by the wealthy
and growing middle class, which resulted in a ‘harvesting fever’ in both countries.
Second, an illegal trade in abalone and loco have threatened, to various degrees, the
sustainability of both fisheries. Third, both resources are located inshore and have
historically been harvested by fishers as an important source of food and/or income.
Finally, although due to different historical backgrounds, South Africa and Chile have
both experienced a political transformation to democracy in the past two decades that
has resulted in new fisheries legislation and policies. These new laws have embraced
broader approaches to fisheries governance, such as Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries
(TURFs) and co-management arrangements, although implementation strategies have
differed between the countries. Both case studies will be described in more detail
below, highlighting the management challenges as well as the different management
approaches that have been adopted. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the
key lessons that have emerged from both cases, and which we argue are important to
consider for small-scale fisheries governance more broadly.
The fisheries crisis in South Africa
The abalone fishery in South Africa has been identified as one of the most difficult fisheries
to manage (Branch and Clark 2006). This is a result of a combination of factors, but largely
refers to the significant rise in the organized illegal trade of abalone since the mid-1990s
Table 1 Key characteristics of the abalone, loco and broader fisheries context in South
Africa and Chile
Fishery characteristics South Africa1 Chile
Beginning of commercial fishery 1949 1940
Beginning of export ~1980s 1974-5
Extent of marketing Worldwide Worldwide
Main export destination Asia (100%) Asia (85.3%)
Maximum landings 2800t (1965) 25 000t (1980)
End of open access 1968 1981
Seasonal ban/closing N/A 1981-1984
Introduction of quota system 1970 1985 -1989
Allocation of quotas Individual
(regional quotas)
Global regional quotas
Total closure of fishery 20082009 1989-1992/1992-2003/2003-2008-
Benthic Exploitation Regime (BER): 1993-97
Allocation of quota through tickets 12 Regional TAC
TURF regulation/decree (Chile)/ TURF
policy (South Africa)
2003 1995
Number of TURFs 20072 15 664 (with decree)3
Legal catch in 2007 125t 2939t
Estimated illegal catch in 2007 ~927t Half of the legal
Export price per kilogram in 2007 (whole mass) US$ 55.17 US$ 15. 94
Number of fishers under the TURFs in 2007 10965 ~30 000
Broader context
Regimes previous to democracy Apartheid (1948-1994) Dictatorship (1973-1989)
Onset of democracy 1994 1989
Neo-liberal policy 1996 1974-75
Democratic fisheries legislation 1998 1991
Establishment of representative fisher organisations 2003 1965-1973 [1973-1989]61990-
1 Much of this data is based on Sauer et al. 2003 and Raemaekers et al. 2011.
2 The year 2007 is used for the following data in the table as it was the last year before South Africa’s abalone fishery
was closed (which corresponds to the official 2006-2007 fishing season). The fishery re-opened in 2010 but more recent
data has not been obtained.
3 Gallardo (2008:99).
4 IFOP 1987 (Julio)-2008.
5 The estimated number of fishers is based on a 2006 calculation that included 264 individual rights holders, 40 diver
entities (for example, companies) and 792 crew members (pers comm., G. Maharaj, DEAT).
6 Labour organisations suppressed during Pinochet’s government (1973-1989).
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lobster into key abalone areas (Tarr 2000). The combined impact of these phenomena have
led to a ‘resource crisis’, which saw an 88 percent decrease in the Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) of the fishery from 615 tonnes in the 1995/6 season to 75 tonnes in the 2007/08
season, and complete closure of the fishery in 2008. The high profile of this fishery began
in 1994 with what was known as the ‘abalone war’, characterized as violent confrontations
between the police and different fisher groups (Hauck 1999).
South Africa’s commercial abalone fishery began in 1949 with an open access fishery
(Sauer et al. 2003). Personal and subsistence use of the resource, however, has a much
longer history and elderly coastal residents recall how they used to wade up to their
ankles and harvest from the rocks (Hauck 1997). Commercial licenses were required
from 1954, but there were no limits on harvesting, which was largely influenced by
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to Japan and South East Asia. The peak of the industry was in 1965, when 2,800 tonnes
of abalone was harvested, with 14 processing plants and 112 divers operating in the
fishery (Sauer et al. 2003). Due to a concern over the declining resource, the first catch
regulations were put in place in 1968, with quota limits applied to the fishery from
1970. See Figure 2 for an overview of commercial landings since 1953.
Thus, the open access fishery evolved over a period of almost 50 years into four distinct
sectors, defined through fisheries law as a means to regulate access: (1) commercial
(industrial scale); (2) recreational (for sport); (3) subsistence (for personal consumption
and limited sale); (4) limited commercial (largely for sale but on a small-scale). The latter
two sectors (subsistence and limited commercial) emerged in South Africa’s post-
democratic fisheries law and policies as a means to cater for historically disadvantaged
individuals that were previously excluded from harvesting marine resources due to
apartheid policies (Isaacs 2006; Sowman 2006).
In addition to the formal fishery sectors outlined in law, the informal fisherya
emerged in the late 1960s when increased government regulations were put in place to
limit harvesting (Hauck 2009). This fishery became significantly more organised and
lucrative in the early-1990s, linked to high prices, the opening up of export markets,
political drivers and ineffective regulatory measures. Thus, the black market fishery
evolved from traditional fishers, many of whom were unsuccessful in receiving a formal
(that is, legal) right to fish, to opportunists, who turned to this fishery for high
economic gain. Thus, the profile of such fishers changed over time and varied between
coastal regions (Hauck 2009; Raemaekers and Britz 2009), and had an increasingly
negative impact on the fishery (Raemaekers et al. 2011).Figure 2 Annual commercial landings and key developments of the abalone fishery in South
Africa. (Fisheries data drawn from Raemaekers et al. 2011).
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stakeholders led to a number of regulatory measures, some of which will be discussed
further below. However, the battle to save the abalone fishery had effectively been lost
when the national Minister responsible for fisheries announced the closure of the
abalone fishery effective from February 2008. Following the closure of the fishery,
whereby 302 small-scale commercial fishers, their crew and their families had their
livelihoods uprooted, organized illegal fishing continued to thrive. Animosity towards
the state intensified in coastal communities and a groundswell of political pressure
emerged so strongly that the newly appointed President of South Africa announced the
re-opening of the fishery in 2010.
Socio-economic and political context of the abalone fishery
The crisis in the abalone fishery has not only been influenced by changes in the ecosys-
tem, but also by social, economic, political and institutional drivers (Hauck 2008, 2009;
Raemaekers et al. 2011). The socio-economic system related to small-scale fisheries in
South Africa has been significantly influenced by the discriminatory laws of the past
(Hersoug and Holm 2000; Hauck and Sowman 2005). The various policies and laws of
the colonial era and apartheid regime effectively denied the majority of black ethnic
groups b access to and ownership of vast stretches of South Africa's coastline and
resources. Furthermore, the country’s historical legacy has contributed to coastal poverty
through racial segregation, land dispossession and unequal distribution of natural
resources (Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007).
South Africa’s democratic elections in 1994, however, led to a radical transformation
of policies and laws that sought to address the inequities that emanated from the apart-
heid era. The fisheries sector was no exception and South Africa’s first democratic fish-
eries law was promulgated in 1998 as the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA 1998).
In addition to ensuring the long-term sustainable use of marine resources, the Act also
seeks to promote equitable access to marine resources, transform the fishing industry
and promote socio-economic benefits for coastal communities (Hauck and Sowman
2005). This law had significant implications for all of South Africa’s fisheries, including
abalone. The TAC for the abalone fishery was redistributed to many more entrants and the
historical commercial and recreational sectors were extended to include small-scale fishers
for the first time (defined as ‘subsistence’ and ‘limited commercial’ in law and policy). While
there were only five abalone quota holders in 1992 (‘white-based’ companies), this
increased to 271 (mostly individuals) in 2002. Of these 271, 84 percent were allocated to
the ‘limited commercial sector’, which aimed to encompass small-scale traditional fishers
(Raemaekers et al. 2011).
Although political transformation was necessary, various obstacles included cumbersome
application processes, local elites gaining access at the expense of traditional fishers and
economically unviable quota allocations (Isaacs 2006; Sowman 2006). Due to a limited
resource, not all applicants were successful in their attempt to gain access to the fishery,
often resulting in families, friends and neighbours in conflict, with some who ‘got’ and
some who did not (Hauck 2009). Furthermore, the implementation of the MLRA has
proven problematic in practice due to the conflicting objectives of sustainability, stability
and equity, which were not adequately defined or prioritised in the Act (van Sittert
et al. 2006; Witbooi 2006). Further, these objectives are influenced by broader national
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2006). This has promoted a market-driven approach through international trade rather
than more direct interventions in terms of poverty alleviation (van Sittert et al. 2006;
Isaacs et al. 2007). With high consumer demand for South Africa’s abalone in the Far East,
coupled with an opening up of international export routes following democracy, the
abalone fishery became highly lucrative and attracted the interests of both traditional
fishers and large-scale profit-seeking individuals and groups. With the entire commercial
catch being exported to the Far East, the focus of management was on ensuring an
economically viable fishery within the limits of the resource. Thus, despite new legislation
to address the inequitable access to marine resources, there remained significant unrest in
coastal communities where many fishers still felt excluded. This dissatisfaction with
new policies and laws was particularly glaring in the abalone fishery where illegal
fishing continued to thrive (Hauck 2009).
The illegal fishery has far outweighed the commercial fishery in terms of harvest
in recent years, with a commercial TAC of 125 tonnes in the 2006/7 fishing season
as opposed to an estimated illegal catch of over 900 tonnes during the same year
(Raemaekers et al. 2011). The modus operandi of the illegal fishers changed from
small-scale to large-scale operations, the use of technology became increasingly sophisti-
cated and the abalone fishery infiltrated into existing criminal groups (Steinberg 2005).
The proliferation of the illegal abalone trade coincided with a decreasing commercial
TAC and a growing despondency of commercial fishers, resulting in enormous challenges
to the fisheries authority and an attempt by the state to respond with new and varied
management strategies.
Management approaches in the abalone fishery
Since 1995, both government and civil society organisations have put in place a number
of management measures to improve compliance and sustain the abalone fishery.
Although these interventions have been varied, and have involved a wide number of
stakeholders, none have had long-term success. Management strategies were developed
as a means of achieving the MLRA’s objectives and in response to a concern for the
growing illegal trade. In particular, and in line with the new fisheries law to address
historical inequities, the redistribution of fishing rights led to the transformation of the
commercial abalone fishery. This was significant at the time, and although there were
challenges, it provided an opportunity to extend access to the fishery to many more
people along the coast, including those who had traditionally harvested abalone.
In addition to the political impetus to redistribute access rights, a primary strategy of
government has been to enhance law enforcement, effectively increasing its overall
compliance budget by 300 percent (from 1995-2004) in order to create a greater presence
along the coast and to target organized criminal syndicates (Hauck and Kroese 2006).
The past decade has seen the focus on law enforcement intensify in response to the
increasingly organised black market trade, with the fisheries authority enhancing its
criminal investigation capacity, establishing partnerships with other law enforcement
agencies (such as the national police, army and navy), devolving compliance authority to
other organisations and levels of government and seconding specialised prosecutors to
focus on serious marine offences (Hauck and Kroese 2006). The impact of these law
enforcement efforts, however, has been challenged with the recognition that the illegal
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allegations of state corruption, law enforcement strategies are not adequately supported
by traditional fishing communities where illegal fishing takes place. The lack of legitimacy
of existing rights and laws governing abalone fishing has eroded an obligation to comply,
and has also hindered the initiation of social controls (Hauck 1999, 2009).
Although important attempts were made by the fisheries authority to initiate various
management strategies (including those discussed above), the abalone policy of 2003
(DEAT 2003) will be highlighted here as the most ground-breaking. This policy, which
established the parameters for the ‘long-term’ (ten year) rights allocation, proposed a
new management plan for the abalone fishery that was considered a ‘radical shift’
forward (Department of Environmental Affairs -DEAT- 2003:3. It clearly stated that
current management strategies had ‘failed to effectively curb poaching’ and that the
abalone resource ‘has been seriously overfished and it has collapsed’ (DEAT 2003:3).
Indeed, this policy was a progressive way forward as it introduced the concept of co-
management, recognised ecosystem impacts (the importance of managing the migration
of west coast rock lobster into key abalone areas), suspended the recreational fishery in
the interests of sustaining commercial livelihoods, established ten year rights and
initiated a TURF system.
Although this policy embraced a number of principles that ought to have enhanced
the management of the abalone fishery, there were significant obstacles that minimised
its effectiveness. One key obstacle was the ineffective implementation of the TURF
system due to the sharing of some zones between fishers, instead of ensuring exclusive
use by those living adjacent to the zone. In addition, the TAC was allocated to individuals
(within zones) rather than allocated to a collective. A second key obstacle was the lack of
consultation and engagement with the stakeholders in the abalone fishery in order to
develop meaningful co-management arrangements, as well as inadequate budget and
capacity within government to enact institutional change and decentralisation. Third was
a lack of formal organisation among abalone fishers, and among small-scale fishers more
broadly in South Africa. Disjointed groups and conflicting voices weakened the fishers’
position to negotiate with government. Finally, there was an expectation from government
that fishers would ‘protect their areas’ from illegal fishers and outsiders. However, fishers
were unable to ‘protect’ their area from friends and relatives who were not given an individ-
ual right but who relied on abalone harvesting for their livelihood (Hauck 2009). Thus, an
inadequate understanding of the socio-economic and political dynamics of the fishery,
coupled with ongoing annual cuts in the TAC, exacerbated the challenges in the abalone
fishery despite attempts at more integrative policies and laws.
The fisheries crisis in Chile
Historical evidence indicates that loco was part of the diet of coastal inhabitants in
Northern Chile and Southern Peru as far back as 6,000 years ago (Reyes 1986). However,
information on Chile’s loco landings prior to the 1960s is scarce. Some data from 1926
indicates that 67 tonnes of loco were landed, but during the 1940s loco landings were
between 1,000 and 2,000 tonnes per year (Reyes 1986).
Up until the mid-1970s, loco consumption was largely domestic and harvesting took
place under an open access regime (Stotz 1997). Loco and other benthic species were
also targeted by summer visitors and recreational fishers during low tides. There were
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and the south, established in 1965 (Geaghan and Castilla 1988). Yearly landings before
the export boom, which started in 1975, were about 4,000 tonnes (Castilla et al. 2007),
but in a short period loco landings reached an unprecedented figure of 25,000 tonnes
in 1980, marking its historical maximum that year. Due to the high price of loco,
numerous people who did not have a historical link to artisanal fishing also became
involved in loco harvesting. Thus, the resource crisis of the loco fishery emerged during
the export boom in the late 1970s, when the yearly landings of loco grew significantly
to meet international demand (Castilla 1995; Castilla et al. 2007; Meltzoff et al. 2002;
Moreno et al. 2007). In an attempt to respond to the perceived over-exploitation of
loco, a number of management measures were implemented. Between 1981 and 1992,
three different regulations were sequentially introduced: (1) reproductive seasons or
seasonal closing (1981-1984); (2) global national quota (1985-1989); and (3) total
closure (1989 and extended by consecutive periods) (Castilla 1995). However, none of
these regulations were implemented with much success. During the global quota
period, official landings were set at a national limit of 4,000 tonnes per year. This quota
was exceeded in 1985 and 1986. In 1987, 21,000 tonnes of loco were officially landed,
while one million units of illegally caught loco were confiscated by the authorities
(Reyes 1990; Meltzoff et al. 2002). In fact, it is argued that the new policy measures
exacerbated the black market trade and the export of loco, and at the same time the
global quota was being exceeded and filled too quickly (Meltzoff et al. 2002). Before the
reproductive seasons were introduced, the high loco prices exacerbated competition
and tension between local and migrant non-local fishers and this came to be known as loco
‘fever’ or loco ‘war’ (Meltzoff et al. 2002). With a growing concern over the sustainability of
the resource, the authorities finally took the radical decision to completely close the fishery
in 1989 (Castilla et al. 2007), just before the return of democracy to the country.
The first extraction ban of loco in Chile (1989-1992), which should have allowed for
a moderate recuperation of the species, also led to a number of challenges such as
increased prices and illegal fishing (Stotz 1997; Castilla 1995; Meltzoff et al. 2002). In
addition, the ban resulted in a lack of scientific data to monitor the resource (as no stock
evaluation could take place), enhanced political unrest (Orensanz and Parma 2010) and
from the state’s perspective, a loss in taxes from the banned fishery (Meltzoff et al. 2002;
Castilla et al. 2007). Thus, the ban led to a variety of conflicts, with diverse role players
unable to reconcile different economic, conservation and livelihood objectives. In 1990,
under the new democratic period, fishers demanded that the ban be lifted (pers comm. S.
Tapia, former president of the TURF Huentelauquén).
The series of failed measures eventually led to a new fishing law in 1991 and a decree
(a rule of law issued by the head of state) in 1997 for the implementation of Management
Areas (MAs), or Chilean TURFs, which was an attempt to approach fisheries management
differently: from individual and competitive extraction to collective and organized extraction
in fixed places, putting an end to fishers’ traditional migrations.
The new Fishery Law (LGPA) guarantees artisanal fishers an exclusive area five miles
from shore (LGPA 1991, Título IV, Art. 47; Subpesca 1991), with TURFs allocated from
shore. The land spaces from where fishers organize the operation of their fishing activities
(called caletas) are in rural and urban areas equivalent to fishing villages/towns, however
some fishers have only small huts, fishing implements and their individually owned boats
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TURFs are more community based. In the latter case, the caletas form more transient
communities brought together for the purpose of production or fish harvesting.
Socio-economic and political context of the loco fishery
The first evidence of loco resource depletion, as well as the first measures to try to
address ‘over-exploitation’, occurred during Pinochet’s regime (1973-1989). Neo-liberal
policies during this time resulted in a re-structuring and adaptation of the fishing
sector in accordance with globalization requirements. Similar to other parts of the world,
Chile’s export policy re-channelled fisheries supply from local and regional markets to
international markets (Gallardo 2008). A higher demand for loco in the international mar-
ket was facilitated nationally through local credit programs and a favourable exchange rate
that stimulated boat investment and processing plants (Castilla 1995; Meltzoff et al. 2002;
Castilla et al. 2007; Moreno et al. 2007). Since the mid-1970s, both industrial and artisanal
fishing increased considerably and during the 1980s, fisheries were the fastest growing
economic sector in Chile (Castilla et al. 2007). Thus, although Chile is a relatively small
nation, it holds its position as one of the top ten countries worldwide with the highest
fisheries landings (Gallardo 2008).
Following democracy in 1989, a new fisheries law was promulgated in 1991 that con-
tinued to prioritise an economic policy that aimed to integrate the Chilean economy
into the global market, thus legitimizing Pinochet’s neo-liberalism, but it also aimed to
be more inclusive and participatory, especially in relation to artisanal fisheries. This
was a significant shift from the years of Pinochet’s dictatorship, when participation was
not on the political agenda.
Although fishing organisations have been established nationally in Chile since 1965,
they ceased to operate in 1973 after the coup d’etat. In 1985, a national commission for
the support of artisanal fishers was gathered and this led to a new national fishers’
organisation in 1990 under the new democracy. There are now two national confedera-
tions (CONAPACH and CONFEPACH), 35 regional federations, and at the ground
level there are the unions, guilds associations and cooperatives, which are the three
legal forms of fisher collectives. Through their collective power, artisanal fishers have
become markedly stronger, securing five marine miles for their primary use, obtaining
allocations of sea bottom through the TURFs for coastal fishers, and influencing
changes to fishing law and related decrees.
Management approaches in the loco fishery
After several years of failed state measures and bans to halt resource depletion, the
1980s also saw fishers’ groups in Chile imposing bans on themselves, in collaboration
with scientists from national universities in some parts of the country. Experimentation
with no-take zones, which became successful in terms of improving yields, led
to alternative management strategies in the form of TURFs (decree No. 355/95;
Subpesca 1995). TURFs were first implemented from 1997/98 (Meltzoff et al. 2002;
San Martin et al. 2010), and promoted conservation, ceconomic and social objectives
(Subpesca 1995). Before this, from 1993-1997, another fishery measure was in
operation called the Benthic Extraction Regime (BER), which consisted of quota
allocations through ‘tickets’. However, this management strategy was short lived
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implemented (Gallardo 2008).
In this way, Chile initiated a TURF system that provided exclusive access to specific
geographical areas, thus being space-based. TURFs are only allocated to organisations,
requiring fishers to come together as collectives in order to be eligible to apply for,
obtain and manage a TURF. The loco fishery continues to be banned outside of TURFs,
thereby providing a direct incentive to apply. The initiation of the TURFs was strongly
subsidized by the state, contributing up to 75 percent of the cost of baseline studies
and follow-up assessments, including a four year moratorium on tax payments.
Although loco are not the only resource exploited in the TURFs, they are, beside sea
urchin, the most economically important and therefore the main motivation behind the
implementation of the TURFs (San Martin et al. 2010). Since 1997, the number of
TURFs has increased consistently. At present, approximately 40 percent of registered
fishers belong to a TURF, and according to the authorities, almost all fishers that work
with benthic resources are presently subsumed under the TURF system (pers comm.
J. Rivera, Subpesca, Nov 2008).
The establishment of TURFs has led to changes of major significance regarding
fishing practices and related activities. Not only have institutional arrangements changed
radically, but there have also been significant impacts in terms of commercialization. The
greatest achievements are considered to be those related to conservation objectives as
well as social issues (Meltzoff et al. 2002; Orensanz et al. 2005; González et al. 2006; Castilla
et al. 2007; Montoya 2007; Gelcich et al. 2008, 2010; Gallardo 2008; Zúñiga et al. 2008).
The conservation outcomes of the TURFs have been considered significant (Castilla
et al. 2007; Gelcich et al. 2010). According to Gelcich et al. (2010:4), the success of
TURFs is a result of an ‘increase in abundance and individual size of targeted resources
within the MEARBS [TURFs] in comparison with open access’. In addition, the TURFs
have ‘served as experimentation tools to refine stock assessment and management
procedures’ (Defeo and Castilla 2005:275). However, while landings have stabilized
(see Figure 3), other studies have questioned the optimistic assessment of the conser-
vation objectives, highlighting the existence of a dual system whereby fishers ‘look
after’ their own TURFs but fish illegally outside their areas, despite the ecosystem
linkages (Orensanz et al. 2005; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
Socio-politically, the fishers have become strengthened and powerful at various levels
and in different areas. TURFs have led to an increased sense of fishers’ ‘ownership’ over
fishing areas, enhanced capacity of fishers and led to a series of incentives. TURFs have
also contributed to a collective approach amongst the fishers. Fishers were required to
become organised, which was significant in that Chile’s political history had partially
dismantled fishers’ organisations. Thus, in the case of many TURFs, organisation
strengthened collective action and contributed to joint decision-making. Further, this
collective strength enhanced fishers’ power to negotiate more broadly with other stake-
holder groups, especially with middlemen and export firms (Montoya 2007; Gallardo
2008; Zuñiga et al. 2008; Gelcich et al. 2010; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
Presently fishers are harvesting in fixed fishing grounds, while previously they could
fish freely throughout the country. The 1991 fishing law resulted in fishers being fixed
geographically to only one region. Thus, instead of competing for the resources in
groups of three or four, as they had done in the past, all the members of the TURFs
Figure 3 Annual landings and key developments of the loco fishery in Chile. (Based on information
obtained from Sernapesca; Carrère, A.; Donoso, E.; Villagra, Pers. Com. 2006, 2010; IFOP; Ortego, M.I., Pers.
Comm., e-mail 2006, 2010; Castilla et al. 2007; Gallardo 2008).
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zones has also been recognized as problematic by some authors as well as by fishers
(Gallardo et al. 2011), with others also arguing that fishers are losing their traditional
fishing practices and skills (Gelcich et al. 2005; Aburto et al. 2009). These, and other
potential losses to fishers as a result of the TURFs, need to be explored further.
TURFs have also led to economic benefits, providing in some cases opportunities for
fishers to diversify their livelihoods to other spheres such as gastronomy and tourism.
The fact that fishers operate collectively in the TURFs, and plan their harvesting strategies
carefully and at economically convenient times, has resulted in greater efficiency and left
fishers with more time to pursue other occupations (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman
2011). The economic viability of the TURFs varies from case to case, but it is largely
recognized that very few fishers are able to rely exclusively on revenue from the TURFs
for their livelihoods (Gelcich et al. 2006; Montoya 2007; Zuñiga et al. 2008; Gallardo and
Friman 2011). Thus, although TURFs have proven to have important economic benefits
for fishers, concerns about the economic viability of TURFs have also been highlighted
(Montoya 2007; Zuñiga et al. 2008; Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman 2011). For
example, Zuñiga et al. (2008) studied 30 TURFs in Region IV, finding that only five did
well economically, while the rest performed inadequately or badly. This raises concerns
regarding fishers’ livelihoods, and the potential impetus that this provides for fishers to
justify illegal fishing. The economic benefits of the TURFs are therefore important, and
some areas have proven more financially viable than others. Nonetheless, fishers have
always had additional occupations, some related to fisheries and others not. TURFs that
rely only on loco occupy the fishers only at specific times of the year (Gallardo 2008).
Issues of equity also need to be explored more thoroughly in relation to TURFs and
the ways social groups relate (Gallardo and Friman 2010). Prior to the resource crisis
and the bans, the loco fishery was open access. Thus, the TURF system introduced the
notion of ‘exclusion’, a key characteristic of TURFs (Christy 1992). TURFs were initiated
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lar areas. To achieve fairness amongst fishing organizations, the law established a series
of criteria for allocating TURFs. However, the boom of the loco attracted more people
into the fishery (not necessarily fishers by profession). While in theory it is argued that
when the number of TURFs increases, the number of those excluded should also
diminish, there are challenges in relation to determining who gains access to the TURFs,
and how a fisher is defined.
According to the First National Fishing Census (INE 2008-2009), approximately 17
percent of artisanal fishers in Chile are ‘Pueblos Originarios’, or indigenous people. In
January 2008, a new law (nr. 20.249) was promulgated that aims to protect indigenous
people’s rights to their traditional spaces, partly addressing the rights of coastal people in
response to historical dispossession of land and resources. This law gives preference to
coastal spaces for the purpose of aquaculture, marine or management areas to indigenous
groups, provided they can show that they have been exerting a consuetudinary use
(fishing use, religious, recreational or medicinal, among others) over the space (Ministerio
de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica –MIDEPLAN- 2008). It is interesting to
note that when these use rights are given to the indigenous communities, they are given
for an indefinite time, which is not the case with the TURFs given to non-indigenous
people, which are for four years subject to renewal. Another equity issue is the difference
between marine destinations given to artisanal fishers and those given to large companies,
many of them being international. Fishers are asking authorities to change the TURF legal
concept from destination to concession, more similar to the one the large-scale aquaculture
farms enjoy. This change would give fishers more tenure security as concessions are for
longer time periods.
There have been important positive benefits that have emerged as a direct result of
Chile’s TURF policy. In particular, conservation outcomes have been positively identified
within the TURFs (not necessarily ‘outside’ them) (Oresanz et al. 2005) as well as the
benefits associated with collective action, livelihoods and in some minor cases economic
security. More recent research, however, has also cautioned that the socio-economic and
political repercussions of the TURFs need to be considered more fully (Montoya 2007;
Zuñiga et al. 2008; San Martin et al. 2010; Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman 2011),
with potential losses to the fishers that may ultimately undermine the TURF approach. It
seems apparent that while the TURFs have achieved a number of positive impacts, more
effort is required to understand and incorporate the perspectives and needs of the fishers
into the management approach. This is necessary in order to ensure that benefits are
sustainable and secured more widely across regions, and that the broader ecological
consequences of harvesting activities within and outside the TURFs are considered
(Orensanz et al. 2005; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
Discussion
Despite different national political histories and socio-economic and fishery circum-
stances in South Africa and Chile, interesting lessons can be gleaned from each
country’s experience in managing the abalone and loco fisheries ‘crisis’. Six themes
have emerged as key lessons for understanding the challenges and prospects for
fisheries governance in each country, and which may be relevant to small-scale fisheries
more broadly.
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as a management strategy to curtail over-exploitation has failed (Hauck 2009; Raemaekers
et al. 2011; Meltzoff et al. 2002; Castilla et al. 2007; Gallardo 2008). The decision to close
the fisheries in both South Africa and Chile was driven by a resource-focussed agenda in
response to a perceived resource collapse. The assumption was that closure (that is, an
outright ban of harvesting) would limit resource use and protect the ongoing decline of
stocks. However, this decision did not adequately consider the human system and the
socio-economic, political and institutional drivers that were influencing resource use.
Thus, these decisions lacked legitimacy from the perspective of the fishers, resulting in the
continuation of abalone and loco harvesting, albeit illegally. This was recognised by the
South African government at the outset of their deliberations to close the abalone fishery:
‘closure of the abalone fishery would not ensure the recovery of the abalone stock, because
illegal exploitation will not stop’ (DEAT 2004:2). Thus, although the challenges were
recognised, scientists urged closure on the basis of a ‘resource crisis’. Similarly, in Chile,
the closure was implemented as a means to prevent over-fishing, but ‘a main effect of the
draconian closure was making the activity illegal, with disastrous consequences for
fishing communities. Illegal fishing never stopped. . .’ (Orensanz et al. 2005:533). Thus,
the closures in both countries impacted the legitimacy of the management system,
whereby access rights were questioned and ‘fairness’ was undermined (Jentoft and
McCay 2003; Hernes et al. 2005).
Second, both countries have highlighted the significance of political change in
influencing fisheries governance. Although at different time scales, both South Africa
and Chile emerged from a politically disenfranchising era to one of democracy, which
promoted fisheries reform. In Chile, the transition to democracy from Pinochet’s recalci-
trant anti-communism and largely suppressed democracy era opened ‘a window of oppor-
tunity’ in which political transformation coupled with resource collapse led to the
opportunity to radically transform fisheries policy and law (Gelcich et al. 2010). Similarly,
in South Africa, the transition from apartheid to democracy provided the opportunity to
redress past injustices through a new fisheries law (van Sittert et al. 2006). By recognising
that existing approaches to the abalone and loco fisheries were failing, new approaches
were explored that garnered the support of new political leaders. In addition to fisheries
management reform, the political environment was also instrumental in promoting
neo-liberal policies that had a significant impact on the sector. While a macro-economic
export policy fuelled international demand for abalone and loco, increased prices and led
to a market-driven approach, it is argued that it in fact undermined efforts of socio-
economic reform and poverty alleviation in coastal communities (Croeser et al. 2006;
Isaacs et al. 2007) and led to broader inequalities (Kay 2012; López 2010). The political
regime of a country, therefore, and its corresponding laws and policy, are instrumental in
influencing fisheries management approaches.
A third key theme that has emerged from these case studies is that fisheries decision-
making remains centralised, albeit at different scales. In South Africa, although there
were attempts by the state to explore co-management and initiate a TURF system, these
approaches were imposed by national government with inconsistent consultation with
the fishers (Hauck 2009; Raemaekers et al. 2011). As a result, they became technical
measures that were developed without adequately considering the social, economic,
political and institutional realities in coastal communities, and therefore largely failed. In
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stakeholder groups, including the fishers, scientists and fisheries authority. This has led
to shared decision-making and responsibility for the management of benthic resources
(Castilla et al. 2007; Gallardo 2008; Gelcich et al. 2010). However, there remain important
aspects of the TURF system that are not adequately adapted to the fishers’ needs. Power
is perceived to remain in the hands of the authorities, particularly in relation to the
period during which fishers can fish, the short-term tenure of TURFs, costly biological
assessments when state subsidies are terminated, and taxes that exacerbate financial
burdens that are seen as inequitable across TURF regions (due to uneven productivity).
Fishers resent some of these top-down strategies (Orensanz et al. 2005), and some argue
that it impacts on the sustainability of their areas, particularly in terms of economic and
ecological impacts and challenges (Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
Thus, even though governance approaches may seem progressive by establishing fisher
‘ownership’ of geographical areas, enhancing equity and promoting co-operative decision
making and management, if they continue to be implemented through a centralised
approach, their success on the ground is jeopardised (Berkes et al. 2001; Hara and
Raakjaer Nielsen 2003).
Fourth is the challenge of illegal fishing. Both countries have grappled with the onset
of illegal fishing amidst enhanced regulatory controls and increased market demand.
However, the perspective of ‘illegal fishing’ in both countries is different due to the
history of fishing regulations. Chile, for example, had an open access system prior to
the closure. The closure put an end to open access, and aimed to manage the resource
‘crisis’. However, illegal fishing resulted and it became the only opportunity for many to
regain access to the fishery. Even after TURFs were introduced, illegal fishing continued
outside of the TURF areas, and even sometimes within. In South Africa, the new fisher-
ies law provided opportunities to broaden access to an already limited entry abalone
fishery. However, a lack of legitimacy of the rights allocation process, coupled with in-
adequate enforcement and lucrative prices, fuelled an illegal fishery. In both cases it
was widely acknowledged that illegal fishing was exacerbated following the closures,
and that the ‘root causes’ of over-exploitation were not adequately understood and
addressed (Castilla 1995; Meltzoff et al. 2002; Oresanz et al. 2005; Castilla et al. 2007;
Hauck 2009; San Martin et al. 2010; v2011). Thus, inadequate and inappropriate
responses to non-compliance, which are reactive and tend to rely on law enforcement
efforts, fail to engage with the underlying socio-economic and political drivers of fisher
behaviour (Raakjær-Nielsen 2003; Hauck 2011).
Fisher organisation has also been identified as a key issue influencing fisheries
governance in Chile and South Africa. Democratisation had different effects in each
country, with Chile re-instating strong representative national fisher organisations,
while South Africa had only significantly mobilised its fishers during the political
transition. Although fishers in South Africa became more represented during the policy
development process for a new fisheries law in the late 1990s, there are no overarching
local, regional or national fisheries bodies. The abalone fishery has a national fisher
association but it is informal and is fraught with regional conflict. In Chile, on the other
hand, national fisher groups have been credited with significantly influencing fisheries
reform and actively engaging in decision-making to protect their interests (Gallardo 2008).
These institutional structures, therefore, are perceived to hold significant power and are
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institutions are instrumental for engaging with government authorities and developing
fisheries management arrangements that are responsive to fishers’ needs (Jentoft and
McCay 2003). Further, the particular history of each country regarding organizational
tradition at grass-roots level is also important in order to understand the different fishery
dynamics. Though suppressed in Chile during Pinochet, the return to democracy saw
fishers organising themselves again. Collective action among fishers constitutes a more
fertile ground to allocate TURFs to collectives, while in South Africa these conditions
were not in place, perhaps partially explaining the individual-based allocation of TURFs
in this country.
A final lesson to highlight is the issue of equity in relation to marginalised and indigenous
groups. South Africa identified equity as a fundamental principle in its new fisheries law,
with the aim of redressing the historical imbalances of the apartheid era by prioritising
access to marine resources to previously disadvantaged groups (that is, traditional fishers
living in coastal communities) (Witbooi 2006). This fundamentally influenced the reshuf-
fling of access rights and was instrumental in the implementation of fisheries policy. Thus,
small-scale fisheries were largely limited to those fishers with traditional rights to the
resource and who had been marginalised and dispossessed historically (Sowman 2006).
In Chile, the allocation of TURFs was intended to be prioritised to those with traditional
fishing grounds, independent of ethnic origins, but a new law has put a focus on indigenous
rights. It remains to be seen whether this new law will create more opportunities regarding
indigenous groups’ rights to the coast. Even in the South African case, although national
laws and policies are in place to promote equitable access and benefits to natural resources,
implementation is often problematic. Equity issues remain at the forefront of small-scale
fisheries debates, which are necessary for addressing the historical marginalisation of fishers
and for creating legitimate governance arrangements that have the support of fisher groups
(Chuenpagdee et al. 2005).
Conclusion
Research on the abalone fishery in South Africa and the loco fishery in Chile have high-
lighted important challenges that are facing many small-scale fisheries around the world,
including resource over-exploitation, inequitable or insecure resource tenure and weak
institutions. Underpinning these challenges is the realisation that fisheries governance
rests on balancing the limits of the resource with the needs and perspectives of fishers
who depend on it for their livelihood (Berkes et al. 2001). Thus, as system thinking
argues, the natural and human systems need to be understood and addressed from the
moment a problem is defined (such as a identifying a ‘crisis’) to the longer term process
of designing and implementing a sustainable governance system (Garcia and Charles
2008). If a crisis is only perceived from an ecological perspective, then it is likely that
management measures will be largely resource-focussed, further undermining the fishery
system as a whole. This is explicitly highlighted by Chuenpagdee et al. (2005: 25), who
state that fisheries challenges need to be tackled by acknowledging the ‘interconnectivity
of concerns for ecosystem health, social justice, livelihoods and food security and food
safety’. This link, between social and ecological systems, is emphasized as being critical to
understanding, and ultimately achieving, the sustainability of fishery systems (Berkes
et al. 2001; Charles 2001; Berkes et al. 2003). It is argued that natural and social systems
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more complexity (Charles 2001; Berkes et al. 2003; Acheson 2006). Thus, multidisciplinary
approaches are required to ‘bridge disciplines and scales, and blend theory and practice, if
we are to understand these linked complex systems and, on the basis of this knowledge, to
design more effective systems of governance. . .’ (Zaelke et al. 2005: 37).
While Chile and South Africa have both explored alternative and more integrated
approaches to fisheries management, such as allocating use rights, including fishers in
decision making and implementing TURFs, they have had varying degrees of success. A
key obstacle has been the legitimacy of these approaches, which have not always
reflected fishers’ experiences and needs, but which is considered critical for implemen-
tation (Berkes et al. 2001; Kooiman et al. 2005; Oresanz et al. 2005; González et al.
2006; Jentoft 2007; San Martin et al. 2010). Top-down driven processes, no matter how
progressive they may seem on paper, will continue to alienate fishers, jeopardise their
livelihoods and threaten the long-term sustainability of the fishery system as a whole. A
sustainable fisheries system, therefore, aims to achieve social, economic, ecological and
institutional sustainability for the benefit of both the resource and the people who rely
on it (Charles 2001; Garcia and Charles 2008; Pomeroy and Andrew 2011).Endnotes
a Informal fishers are considered those traditional, small-scale fishers who continue
to harvest marine resources without a permit, even though it is illegal to do so, with
many being driven by socio-economic and political factors (Hauck 2008). b Black ethnic
groups, in the South African context, are those groups identified by apartheid policy as
‘Indian’, ‘African’ or ‘Coloured’. c Conservation is defined as the ‘rational, effective, effi-
cient, present and future use of the natural resources and their environment’ (LGPA,
Titulo I, Art. 2, 14; Subpesca 1991).
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